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1 Introduction
One of China's great successes during the period of
the command economy was to provide a large
majority of its population with access to basic
health services at an affordable price. This con-
tributed to major improvements in the life of rural
people. This issue of the IDS Bulletin asks whether
China will be able to maintain cost-effective rural
health services as it transforms itself into a market
economy The answer to this question is of imme-
diate concern to the hundreds of millions of people
living in the rural areas of China. lt is also relevant
to those interested in the health services of low and
middle income countries and of countries in tran-
sition to a market economy
This issue is an output of a collaboration between
the Shanghai Medical University (SMU) and the
IDS.' Researchers from these institutions have been
studying the impact of economic and institutional
reform on China's rural health services for several
years. The article by Tang et al. describes case stud-
ies they have undertaken in three poor counties.2
Several articles in this issue use the study findings
as illustrative examples.
Several of the articles in this issue were written
while its author was an IDS Visiting Fellow. Early
drafts of the articles were presented to a two-day
workshop held in March 1996. The workshop's
aims were to contribute to debates on health sector
reform in China and to explore the lessons from
r This issue is the product of a long-term collaboration
beween the Shanghai Medical University and the IDS
Health Unit. This collaboration has been funded over a
number of years by the International Health Policy
Programme (IHPP), the International Development
Research Centre (IDRC), the British Council and the
Overseas Development Administration (ODA). In
addition to supporting a major research project, these
agencies facilitated the production of the Bulletin by
funding visiting fellowships to the IDS for authors of the
articles, a two-day workshop, and the translation and
editing of papers. The views expressed in these artIcles
are not necesarily those of any of the funders.
Z The study findings have been published in English in
Bloom et ai. 1995, and in Chinese in Gu (ed.), 1996.
In addition to the authors of the papers the
participants included Lennart Bogg, David Britt, Sarah
Cook, Biyan Haddon, Sheila Hillier, Bengt Hojer, Deana
Leadbeter, and Hilary Standing. Their comments were
incorporated into revised drafts of the articles.
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China for other countries. The articles by Li et al.
and Yu et al. discuss the impact of substantial user
charges on access to medical care, particularly by the
poor. The articles by Deng et al., Tang, Chen, Shu
and Yao, and Kaufman et al. describe how different
providers of rural health services have responded to
changes in their economic and institutional environ-
ment. The articles by Gong and Wilkes and Zhan et
al. discuss two major inputs to rural health services
- personnel and drugs. These articles are followed
by two on sources of finance - one by Zuo, on local
government finance, and another by Carrin et al., on
rural health prepayment schemes. The article by Gu
and Bloom outlines a strategy for rural health service
reform. An earlier version of this article was pre-
sented to a national meeting of health planners
called to prepare for a National Health Policy
Conference convened by the State Council.
Vietnam has also had very good health indicators for
its level of economic development. lt established a
rather similar health service to China's during the
period of the command economy Vietnam began its
transition to a market economy after China. The arti-
cle by Witter identifies lessons that Vietnam can learn
from China in formulating strategies for rural health
sector reform. The article by Tipping and Dung dis-
cusses some attempts by Vietnam's government to
address the problems in the rural health services.
They argue that political leadership will have an
important influence on the development of Vietnam
health services. This is also true in China, where the
kind of health service that emerges from the period
of transition will depend, to a considerable extent, on
the priority government gives to meeting the most
pressing health needs of the population.
2 Health Sector Reform
Until recently, the health sectors of command
economies and many low and middle income coun-
tries were organised as government owned and
financed enterprises. Health workers were public
servants and the system was controlled through a
hierarchical bureaucracy However, many countries
are questioning the appropriateness of this organi-
sational model and some, including China, are
introducing substantial reforms (Cassels 1995).
New thinking in low and middle income countries is
often strongly influenced by changes taking place in
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advanced market economies. A number of the latter
are exploring new organisational models for their
health services (Saitman and von Otter 1992).
Chemichovsky (1995) argues that a new paradigm is
emerging which focuses on the relationship between
three functions: health finance; organisation and
management of consumption of publicly funded care
(referred to in this article as 'purchasing of services');
and service provision. He argues that a key strategy
for preserving the benefits of public funding while
encouraging providers to be efficient and responsive
to consumer needs is to separate finance from service
provision because this puts pressures on health facil-
ities to give value for money4 This theory has not be
fully tested, and there is not enough experience with
different reform models to demonstrate their superi-
ority to centralised management.
Organisational structures that work well in
advanced market economies are not necessarily
appropriate for low and middle income countries.
This is particularly the case where administrative
and regulatory systems are weak. Policy makers
need to keep this in mind when thinking about
health sector reform or they risk provoking a deter-
ioration of services. Broomberg (1994) argues that
decision makers need more information on how
health sector structures operate in different eco-
nomic and institutional situations, before they can
make informed choices between reform options.
China has been a laboratory for testing models of
health sector organisation for many years. During the
30 years after 1949 China pioneered the develop-
ment of cost-effective services that combined public
finance, a hierarchical management system and tight
political control. Since the early 1980s China has
reformed its economic and administrative system,
and these changes have strongly affected health sec-
tor organisation. Its policy makers are struggling with
fundamental questions about how the health sector
should be structured in a market economy
The Ministry of Health (MoH) has been aware for
some time that the rural health services are finding
it difficult to adapt to the emergence of a market
According to Chernichovsky (1995), finance and
purchasing are integrated in Australia, Canada, UK, and
Sweden, and purchasing and service provison are
integrated in Israel, Netherlands, and American HMOs
under Medicaid.
economy As part of its effort to learn more about
the situation in poor counties, the Department of
Health Policy and Law of the MoH encouraged the
SMU and IDS to develop case studies in these areas.
The State Council, the highest level of government,
has recognised the health sector's problems by con-
vening a national conference on health policy in
December 1996. The decisions of the State Council
were not available when this issue went to press.
China's experience has influenced international
health policies considerably The primary health
care concept, on which the health policies of many
international agencies are based, was strongly influ-
enced by China's rural health services of the 1970s.
More recently, the leader of the team that prepared
the World Development Report on Health (World
Bank 1993) had extensive experience in China dur-
ing the early 1980s. The current debates about
restructuring China's health sector will undoubtedly
have a strong influence on future thinking about
health sector reform (Hsiao 1995).
3 China's Rural Health Services
Prior to Economic Reform
During the 30 years after 1949 China transformed
itself from a country with very poor health to one
with less sickness and premature death than most
countries with similar levels of national income.
Most of this improvement was due to a dramatic fall
in the prevalence of severe poverty, improvements
in the rural environment, increases in literacy, and
provision of preventive and curative health services.
By the mid-1970s China had established a highly
structured, three-tiered, health service. Most villages
(85 per cent) had a health station staffed by barefoot
doctors, peasants who were trained as part-time
health workers. The barefoot doctors led public
health campaigns and provided basic curative care.
Most townships had health centres that provided
referral services and supervised preventive activities.
Every county had a hospital and specialised insti-
tutes that organised the preventive programmes
The three-tier health services ensured good cover-
age by preventive programmes and provided afford-
'These data come from Yen and Chen (1991) and the
3rd and 4th Census.
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able basic medical care. They also organised mass
public health campaigns to clean up the environ-
ment, get rid of vermin, and destroy the snails that
carry schistosomiasis. This contributed to a dra-
matic increase in life expectancy at birth from 39
years during the late 1940s to 68 in 1981 and 69 in
1990. China's population is ageing and heart dis-
ease, cancer and strokes have replaced malnutrition
and infectious diseases as the major causes of death
in most parts of the country.
4 Health Sector Reform in Rural
China
China is transforming itself into a 'socialist market
economy' This involves changing from collective to
household agricultural production; phasing out
price controls; reforming state-owned enterprises;
creating a labour market; and developing new
forms of enterprise ownership. China has experi-
enced rapid economic growth and its gross national
product increased by 9.5 per cent a year, in real
terms, between 1978 and 1994 (SSB 1995). The
following describes how the rural health services
have changed during this period.
4.1 Decreased reliance on state
and collective funding
Prior to the 1980s, government, communes (the
units of collective agricultural production), and
users of services funded the rural health services (Yu
1992). The government paid salaries and operating
expenses of government health facilities and funded
several preventive programmes. The communes
paid village health workers in the same way that
they paid other members of the collective and they
paid the salaries of employees of commune-owned
health centres. Patients bought their own drugs and
paid treatment costs. Most communes ran coopera-
tive medical schemes which reimbursed a portion of
members' medical expenditure (Feng et al. 1995).
The sources of health finance have changed a great
deal between 1978 and 1993 (World Bank 1996).
Government's share of total national health expen-
diture (exclusive of subsidised care for government
workers) fell from 28 per cent to 14 per cent and
the share of rural cooperative medical schemes fell
from 20 per cent to two per cent. On the other
hand, the share of out-of-pocket payments rose
from 20 per cent to 42 per cent. Rural health facili-
ties now finance more than three-quarters of their
expenditure from payments by patients.6
4.2 Decentralisation of public
sector health services
Government health services have been radically
decentralised since the early 1980s, and higher lev-
els of the government health service now have little
influence on the behaviour of lower levels.
Provincial and county health departments answer
directly to their local government. Townships have
been re-established to perform the administrative
tasks previously undertaken by communes. They
are responsible for the health centres and are their
only source of government finance.
4.3 Increased autonomy of health
facilities
Managers of health facilities have much more freedom
from interference by administrative and political
authorities than previously This has been reinforced
by the fiscal responsibility system which allows facili-
ties to use surplus revenue to pay bonuses to their
employees and to invest in new equipment.
4.4 Moves toward a labour market
Health worker pay used to be set nationally and peo-
ple had to work where they were assigned. Health
facilities now supplement basic salaries with bonuses,
health workers are allowed to change their place of
employment, and private practice is permitted.7
Managers of health facilities still cannot fire personnel
and, in many cases, they have to take on additional
staff, even if existing personnel are not fully employed.
This is because of the government policy of providing
newly graduated health workers with a job.
4.5 Decreased political mobilisation
China's health services no longer have the high
political profile they had in the 1960s and 1970s,
when communities were mobilised to take part in
During a recent visit to poor rural counties in Henan
Province, one of the authors found township health
centres that earned 90 per cent of their revenue from
user charges.
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public health campaigns and the service ethic
strongly influenced health work. Individuals and
institutions now give priority to earning money.
This change in ethos is reflected in the priority that
local political leaders give to economic growth. The
shift to household agricultural production has also
made it almost impossible to mobilise people to
take part in public health campaigns, since they can
no longer be paid a share of collective production
for the time they spend on them.
5 The Performance of the Rural
Health Services
China's health indicators are no longer improving
rapidly. For example, the under-five mortality rate
declined steadily until the early 1980s, after which
it stabilised at 44 per 1,000 (World Bank 1996).
These figures are still very good when compared
with 124 in India, and 61 in the Philippines, but
they represent a slowing down of improvement
and are worse than the rates of 19 in Sri Lanka and
Malaysia (UNICEF 1994). The resistance to further
mortality declines is due to the continuing exis-
tence of substantial numbers of people living below
the poverty line and to the growing differences
between regions in the provision of basic health
services.
Rural health services have expanded rapidly in the
booming eastern part of the country where new
buildings have been built, new equipment has been
acquired, and sophisticated drugs are widely avail-
able. Residents of these areas expect much more
than a basic health service. The major policy
dilemma is how to reconcile their desire for more
and better services with the need to control costs.
The situation is different in poor counties, the home
of the majority of the estimated 80 million people
with incomes below the poverty line. The major
problems of their health services are related to inad-
equate funding and weak management and regula-
tion. The remainder of Section 5 describes these
problems.
In 1990 almost half the village health facilities were
private, 3.3 per cent of health workers, based outside of
villages, were in full-time private practice, and an
unknown number of public sector doctors worked part-
time in private facilities or in other public hospitals (Liu
et al. 1994).
5.1 Rises in the cost of health
services
According to a large-scale survey, an average rural
household spent nine per cent of its income on
health in 1993 and those living in poor counties
spent a slightly lower proportion (MoH 1994). The
cost of personnel and drugs, the major components
of rural health care, are rising rapidly
Between 1978 and 1994, average wages of employ-
ees in health care, sports and social welfare almost
tripled, after taking into account the rise in the
retail price index.8 This was due to increases in
basic pay and bonuses. The rise in health worker
incomes reflected the rise in living standards in the
regions that were growing rapidly9 Government
grants to health facilities have not kept up with
salary increases and health facilities have had to
generate additional revenue from charges for ser-
vices and selling drugs at a profit. The pay rises
were not necessarily accompanied by increases in
productivity On the contrary, the average workload
of health workers has decreased in many rural facil-
ities (see Gong and Wilkes this issue).
Drug expenditure has increased dramatically For
example, Bloom et al. (1995) report a quadrupling of
drug spending by hospitals and health centres in two
counties and an eight-fold increase in a third, between
1981 and 1992. There are disagreements about the
importance of rises in drug prices as opposed to
changes in prescribing practices.1° However, there are
good reasons to believe that overuse of drugs has
become a serious problem (see article by Zhan et al.).
5.2 Problems of access to services
A recent survey found that two-thirds of people
reporting an illness had consulted a health worker
(MoH 1994). The proportion was only slightly
Between 1978 and 1994 the average wage in health,
sports and social services rose from 573 to '51l5
while the RPI rose from loo to 313 (SSB 1995, pages 23
and 45).
The rise in real income probably overstates the
improvement in living standards because it does not
take into account the fact that people now have to pay
for services that were previously provided free of charge.
The State Statistical Bureau (1993) reports that the
rate of increase of drug prices was slightly greater than
the rate of inflation, while a survey by the MoH (1992)
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lower in poor counties (63.3 per cent), suggesting
that access to basic health services is reasonably
good. This is because most people live within easy
walking distance of a village health worker. Also,
the cost of a consultation is low
The poor do not have access to all the services
they require. They are less likely than others to
consult a qualified doctor when they are seriously
ill (Croll 1994) and they may find it difficult to
pay for a full course of drug treatment.11 The arti-
cle by Zhan et al. shows that the cost of an average
prescription was between two and five times the
average per capita daily income of peasants in
three poor counties. Ability to pay is a major
determinant of access to inpatient care. The survey
cited in the previous paragraph found that 47.8
per cent of those referred to hospital in poor coun-
ties did not receive inpatient treatment, compared
with 29.4 per cent in wealthy counties. Over half
of those not admitted to hospital said this was
because of its cost.
Severe illness and the cost of medical care is
believed to be an important cause of poverty (Chen
1994). The article by Yu et al. shows that an average
hospital admission costs almost 60 per cent of the
annual net income of a poor household. Many
households have to borrow money to pay medical
bills for a seriously ill family member. In some cases
this is the start of a cumulative process of increasing
debts and asset sales, culminating in a shock that
leaves the household destitute. According to gov-
ernment policy, the social relief system should pre-
vent this from happening. However, local
governments in poor areas do not spend much
money on social relief and they allocate a very small
proportion of this money for medical care (Ahmad
and 1-lussain 1991).
found rates twice as high. The latter finding may reflect
the increasing use of expensive branded products
produced by joint ventures with international
companies.
A particularly unfortunate example is that of the
treatment of tuberculosis which requires the use of
drugs for an extended period of time. There are reports
of people who only purchase a shorter period of
treatment and go on to develop serious complications.
The government now favours the provision of
tuberculosis drugs at highly subsidised prices.
5.3 Financial problems of health
facilities
Many health facilities in poor areas are experiencing
severe financial problems because they cannot gen-
erate enough revenue to compensate for the slow
growth of government grants. Most village health
workers earn money by charging consultation fees,
selling drugs, and working their plot of land (see
Deng et al. this issue).'2 In some areas they receive
modest payments from government for providing
preventive services. These payments do not com-
pensate for the time they should spend on these ser-
vices. Many village health facilities are run down
and ill-equipped because health workers do not
spend money on maintenance or equipment.
Township health centres in poor areas are experi-
encing serious financial problems (Xiang and Hillier
1995). They find it difficult to compete for patients,
since their most experienced personnel have left for
better paid work in other facilities. Many of their
employees have little work, yet many facilities have
hired additional staff.'3 Some health centres have
cut spending on operating costs and neglected
maintenance in order to pay salaries. As a result of
these problems, many health centres are run down
and they play a diminished role in the three-tier
network (see Tang this issue).
County hospitals have fewer financial problems. They
have been more successful in attracting patients,
including those covered by insurance (employees of
government or state enterprises). The challenge for
policy makers is to prevent excessive rises in the cost
of care in these facilities (see Chen this issue).
5.4 Weakening of preventive
services
The preventive services have continued to improve
in the richer areas, but they face serious problems in
many poor counties, as the article by Shu and Yao
illustrates. One sign of this is the resurgence of pre-
ventable illnesses such as tuberculosis and schisto-
somiasis. Another is th relatively high infant
mortality rate of 72 per 1,000 in poor areas corn-
12 Some villages pay their local health wokers a salary
(Tang et al. 1994). These villages tend to be located in
the richest regions, where the village welfare fund
receives money from village-owned non-agricultural
enterprises.
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pared with the average of 41 per 1,000 for all rural
areas (MoH 1994). Shu and Yao (1997) report very
high maternal mortality rates in two poor counties.
One reason for the problems in the preventive pro-
grammes is that village and township health facilities
give priority to the better paid curative services.
Another reason is that the county-level preventive
institutes, the anti-epidemic stations (AES) and
maternal and child health (MCH) centres, are no
longer fully funded by government. A recent survey
found that AESs received 44 per cent of their bud-
gets from government and MCH centres received 33
per cent (MoH 1994). Many of these institutes have
compensated for shortfalls in finance by charging for
preventive services, competing for outpatients, and
offering special services, such as annual physical
examinations of food handlers. However, the suc-
cess in revenue generation has been achieved at the
expense of a deterioration in rural preventïve pro-
grammes, because too few resources (personnel and
operating expenses) are allocated for rural work.
5.5 Conclusions
The principal lesson of the experience described
above is that the structure of the health sector and
the economic and institutional context within
which it operates strongly influences its perfor-
mance. Section 6 discusses the influence of mecha-
nisms of health finance, systems of payment of
service providers, the relationship between pur-
chasers and providers of services, and the health
regulatory framework. Section 7 discusses the influ-
ence of factors outside the health sector.
6 China's Rural Health System
Since the late 1970s, health services in poor rural
areas of China have been transformed from a tightly
organised system to what increasingly resembles a
weakly regulated market (see Figure 1). Policy mak-
ers are searching for an organisational structure that
is appropriate to the changed economic and institu-
tional circumstances.
For example, during a visit to a poor county in Henan
province, one of the authors met a health worker whose
only job was to give 15-20 injections a day and another
who took 3-4 X-rays a day
6.1 Sources of finance
lt is widely believed that the heavy reliance on user
charges has diminished the demand for services
(particularly for inpatient care) and denied the poor
access to basic services. The government is encour-
aging localities to address these problems by estab-
lishing health prepayment schemes. The existing
schemes derive revenue from local government, vil-
lage collective bodies and individual households
and spend most of it reimbursing scheme members
a part of the medical costs they incur (see Carrin et
al. this issue). Government hopes these schemes
will become an important source of finance for rural
health facilities.
Health prepayment schemes have been most suc-
cessful in rich areas. One reason is that households
and local governments are better able to make sub-
stantial contributions to the schemes. Another is
that governments in rich areas tend to have more
effective administrative systems (Wang and Bai
1991). This experience underlines the need to
understand health prepayment schemes in the con-
text of a broader effort to improve the finance and
management of local services.
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The management committees of most health pre-
payment schemes focus entirely on collecting
money and ensuring that it is used for the benefit of
scheme members. They pay much less attention to
the services provided, or their cost. Or, if they
recognise the problem, they have little power to
influence the service providers. In other words, they
do not play an effective purchasing role. This role
was previously achieved by a combination of tight
administrative control by different levels of the
MoH, and close supervision of service providers by
local political structures. lt is generally believed that
this system worked reasonably well, although it
appears that problems with the management of pre-
payment funds contributed to their collapse during
the early 1980s (Feng et al. 1995).
6.2 Providers of health services
The way that health facilities are financed encour-
ages inefficiency The size of their government grant
tends to be related to the number of beds they have
and the number of people they employ; it is also an
outcome of negotiations between government offi-
cials and facility managers. In recent years, facilities
Figure 1 Changes in China's rural health system since the late 1 970s
users of health
services
1
third party
payers
purchaser of
health services
e.-
2
3
regulators
1 Increased reliance on user charges, collapse of local prepayment schemes, and
decreased share of government funding
Increased autonomy of health facilities from central planning or political control
Diminished constraints on opportunistic behaviour
1 providers of
health services
have had to finance an increasing share of their
salary bill out of revenues they generate, them-
selves. In spite of this, local personnel bureaux have
continued assigning people to health facilities,
whether or not they are needed. Health facilities
have had to increase revenue generation and control
spending on non-salary items in order to pay their
health workers.
Government price bureaux set the charges for
health services. They keep consultation fees and
bed charges low. However, they permit health facil-
ities to earn a mark-up on wholesale drug prices
and to charge relatively high prices for new tech-
nologies. The response of health facilities has been
to increase the volume of drug sales and to buy new
equipment.14 They have also given priority to cura-
tive services. This underlines the need to assess how
changes in the system of health finance affect incen-
tives to service providers.
The practice of financing different services through
parallel vertical channels has also led to ineffi-
ciency. For example, it has created a complex sys-
tem for providing reproductive health services, in
which family planning services, treatment of
gynaecological problems, antenatal examinations
and deliveries are provided by different people,
sometimes in different facilities (see Kaufman et al
this issue). Zuo argues that it would be possible to
improve reproductive health services at little addi-
tional cost by making better use of the available
resources.
6.3 Purchasers of health services
Local governments have arms length relationships
with health facilities. This relationship is frequently
formalised in a contract that defines how much the
facility will be paid and what services it will pro-
vide. Government should be able to use these con-
tracts to influence health facilities.15 However, most
local governments only care that health facilities
meet financial targets.
"Health facilities usually have to supplement government
funding for capital improvements from other sources. For
example, in one county, all employees were invited to
contribute to a fund with the expectation that they would
be paid higher bonuses out of the additional revenue. In
another facility, one health worker put up some capital in
exchange for becoming a joint owner of the facility
8
The apparent inability of local governments to act
as effective purchasers of health services reflects,
among other things, the fact that they provide less
than a quarter of the budgets of health facilities.
Their ability to influence the behaviour of service
providers will be greater if more resources become
available through increased government grants or
prepayment schemes. However, the following ques-
tions have to be answered before an effective pur-
chasing function can be established:
Should local government be the purchaser or
should prepayment schemes, themselves, nego-
tiate with health facilities?
Will it be possible to make enough reliable
information available to monitor the perfor-
mance of health service providers?
Will local governments or prepayment schemes
have the expertise to act as effective purchasers?
Will anyone have an incentive to act in the
interests of users in monitoring health service
providers?
Can representative bodies of users play a role in
monitoring the performance of providers?
6.4 Health service regulation
Most health services in advanced market economies
have complex arrangements to prevent dangerous
practices. These frequently include regulations that
give professionals an exclusive right to provide cer-
tain services and protect them against criminal
charges should they accidentally harm a patient.
The organised professions ensure that members
provide an appropriate standard of care, in
exchange. They also use this power to prevent other
people from competing for patients.
China does not have a highly developed health regula-
tory system. As the article by Gong and Wilkes
demonstrates, the training of doctors varies consider-
ably. Until recently, people who had not graduated
from a medical college could be promoted to a doctor's
position. In theory health workers were closely super-
One example of how this might work is in Yurman
Province where each health centre is given a grade based
on their performance in achieving service delivery
targets. Their employees are paid small bonuses if the
score is high.
vised public sector employees, so they could only
offer services they were competent to provide. In
practice, this has not always been the case and now
that health workers are no longer integrated into a
functioning administrative system, many are virtually
unsupervised. Increasing numbers of health workers
are in private practice. The principal protection left to
users is the reputation of individual health workers
and competition from other providers.
The problems that can arise are illustrated in the
case of drugs. All health workers, including rural
doctors with less than a year's training, are allowed
to sell any drug, except narcotics and some anti-
psychotic medication. Many of these products are
ineffective if not used appropriately, and some can
have serious side-effects. Furthermore, since the
government's monopoly of drug distribution has
ended, increasing amounts of defective drugs have
entered the market. Patients are no longer certain
they will obtain cost-effective and relatively safe
drug therapy for common health problems. Some
form of regulation is required to control drug qual-
ity and prevent inadequately trained practitioners
from supplying certain pharmaceutical products.
However, care needs to be taken to avoid regula-
tions that disrupt the supply of essential drugs to
patients in poor rural areas.
7 Economic and Institutional
Context of the Health System
Changes in the economic and institutional environ-
ment have strongly affected China's health services.
7.1 Local government tiannce
The article by Zuo argues that China shares, with
other transitional economies, the need to reform its
system of local government finance (Bird et al.
1995). The lowest levels of government are respon-
sible for many services, but do not have the
resources to finance them. Many county and town-
ship governments in poor areas face serious finan-
cial difficulties, and they spend up to 80 per cent of
their budgets on personnel (Wong et al. 1995). This
problem arises partially because government has
found it difficult to establish new taxation systems.
lt is also due to the inability of government to
induce local governments in rich areas to transfer
more revenue to poor regions (Wong et al. 1995).
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Local governments supplement taxes by charging
for services and collecting contributions from indi-
viduals and local enterprises. They are not part of
the tax system and they are not subject to inter-
regional transfers. These sources of revenue can be
viewed as quasi-taxes, because they are imposed by
legally constituted local administrations. There are
parallels between this source of finance and 'com-
munity financing' in other countries.
Governments in rich localities collect a large
amount of revenue from taxes and other sources.
The MoH's advocacy of health prepayment schemes
is a means of putting pressure on these govern-
ments to give health a higher priority. It is possible
to envisage a time when successful schemes will be
integrated into formalised systems of local govern-
ment finance or social health insurance.
Local governments in poor areas, on the other
hand, have a limited tax base and find it difficult to
collect any other revenue. They may not even be
able to finance basic health services out of local
resources. In these areas, a successful health sector
reform may have to include reforms to the system of
local government finance that provide additional
support from higher levels of government, accord-
ing to Zuo (this issue).
7.2 The labour market
The most important characteristics of the market
for health workers in recent years have been sub-
stantial pay increases, increasing mobility of health
workers, and pressure on health facilities to main-
tain staffing levels. Health facilities in rich areas
have been able to finance pay rises and increased
employment, because they have benefited from
increased demand for their services.
Health facilities in poor areas, where public sector pay
has risen faster than average rural incomes, face
increasing financial difficulties. China has the same
choice as many other countries: to finance nation-wide
salary levels by substantial fiscal transfers to poor
areas, or to allow differences in levels of pay to grow,
with the expectation that poor areas will lose skilled
personnel.'6 Health centres in poor areas have already
lost large numbers of their most experienced staff.
6 Many health facilities in poor areas no longer pay
even the basic government salary
7.3 Regulatory systems
The weakening of administrative and political con-
trols has been more rapid than the establishment of
regulatory structures to constrain opportunistic
behaviour. Local governments, particularly in poor
rural areas, have not replaced central planning with
a rules-based regulatory system and local interest
groups strongly influence both 'collective' and 'pri-
vate' entities (Lichtenstein 1993). This highlights
the importance to successful health sector reform of
regulatory systems that include: independent finan-
cial audit, the legal definition of the rights and
obligations of non-governmental entities, and the
establishment of local accountability mechanisms.
7.4 Political factors
Political factors strongly influence health sector
development (Reich 1995; Walt 1994). In recent
years all levels of government in China have given
top priority to economic development, and have
paid relatively little attention to health. This is
reflected in the anti-poverty programme which
tends not to fund the provision of even basic social
services.
In the absence of a national health development
strategy that takes into account how the health sec-
tor is financed, health services have expanded sub-
stantially in the richer areas, where household
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